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REFLECTIONS UPON THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA: SELECTIONS FROM
SECURITIES LAW, ARBITRATION, AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Anthony Michael Sabino*

I.

INTRODUCTION

It would be a herculean task, indeed, to catalog the many, many
contributions made to American jurisprudence by the late Justice
Antonin Scalia in his thirty years on the Supreme Court, even when the
scope of such an analysis is narrowed to topics germane to corporate and
business law. Such an endeavor would be far beyond the pale of the oral
presentation recently given by the instant writer, even accounting for the
inclusion of supplementary written materials therewith.
Therefore, the objective of the instant Article is to provide a more
comprehensive treatment of the topics touched upon that day, via,
among other means, the inclusion herein of appropriate citations to the
opinions of the great man himself, as further augmented with references
to other relevant authorities.
A secondary goal, albeit no less desirable, is to promote a more
fulsome discussion of the learned Justice's jurisprudence, and thereby
encourage a greater appreciation of his opinions. This is a worthwhile

*Partner, Sabino & Sabino, P.C., Professor of Law, St. John's University Tobin College of
Business, Special Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University,
Judicial Law Clerk, Hon. D. Joseph DeVito, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New
Jersey. This Article is an expansion of remarks originally delivered to the Nassau Academy of Law,
Nassau County Bar Association, on May 24, 2017. Accordingly, we extend appreciation to the
principal speakers from that event, the Honorable Joseph F. Bianco, United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York, and Professor Ronald J. Colombo, Maurice A. Deane School of
Law at Hofstra University. As with all our writings, we remember our constant source of
inspiration, the late Mary Jane C. Sabino, Esq., attorney, professor of law, author, and, most
important, beloved spouse and mother. Our thanks to Michael A. Sabino, Esq., and James N.
Sabino, M.S., M.B.A., for their invaluable assistance in researching this Article. This Article is
dedicated to our newest family member, William Michael Sabino, son of Michael A. and Katlyn.
Welcome to the family, with this first of what will surely be many such dedications.
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endeavor, not merely to ascertain the precise holdings of the Supreme
Court, as illuminated by Justice Scalia's opinions, but also to better
comprehend the influence of Justice Scalia's writings upon the shape
and direction of American law.
In order to facilitate the reader's focus, the following discussion is
synthesized along three dominant topical lines. The first of these, while
rooted in the laws of securities regulation, concomitantly provides
valuable insight into deciding just how far American law can reach
beyond our own national borders.
II.

FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS,

EXTRATERRITORIALITY, AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD.

Assuring transparency and honesty in the securities markets is one
of the most significant achievements of American law. This is
accomplished, in the main, by the Securities Act of 1933,' and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 which substituted the insidiously
flawed former policy of caveat emptor for the more disciplined and fair
standard of caveat vende.
To be sure, while this comprehensive scheme of market regulation
has not been without its share of failures,4 these twin pillars of federal
securities law have historically accomplished great things in assuring
that the American stock markets are fundamentally fair, transparent, and
honest. And, when malefactors defy the statutory regime of, simply put,
"disclosure, disclosure, disclosure,"' there are more than adequate means
to punish them for their dishonesty.6
But in an increasingly interlinked global economy, can foreigners,
purportedly defrauded in overseas securities transactions, seek redress

1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2012).
2. Id. §§ 78a-78qq.
3.

Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 170-

71 (1994).
4. See, e.g., In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 779 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 2015)
(summarizing the essence of the now-infamous Madoff fraud, and citing numerous prior decisions
detailing the same).
5. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 171, 173 (discussing the significance of disclosure
among the federal securities laws).

6. See 15 U.S.C.

§78j(b);

17 C.F.R.

§ 240.10b-5

(2017) (commonly referred to as,

respectively, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder). These broad
anti-fraud prohibitions have been rightly characterized as the "ultimate weapon" against stock
market fraudsters. See Anthony Michael Sabino & Michael A. Sabino, From Chiarella to Cuban:
The Continuing Evolution of the Law of Insider Trading, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 673, 680
(2011) ("Rule lOb-5 and its parent Section 10(b) are paramount.").
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for their alleged injuries under American securities laws and bring their
grievances before the courts of the United States?
That question bedeviled the federal bench for decades, but was
finally put to rest by Justice Scalia in Morrison v. National Australia
Bank Ltd 7 Morrison presented the divisive issue known by the
mathematical moniker of "foreign securities fraud cubed" or "foreign
securities fraud to the third power." In other words, the formula was
foreign investor times foreign securities times purchased on a foreign
stock exchange.
In Morrison, the lead plaintiff was an Australian national. He and
others had purchased the securities of the titular bank on a foreign stock
exchange.' Hence, the appellation "securities fraud cubed" or "securities
fraud to the third power" was fully apropos. The essential question was
whether U.S. courts had jurisdiction over such an alien matter to
decide the controversy pursuant to the anti-fraud provisions of federal
securities law."o
Prior to Morrison becoming the law of the land, a number of
federal appellate courts had answered that question in the affirmative.
Chief among these tribunals was the Second Circuit, which had long
advocated asserting federal jurisdiction over such cases. The tribunal had
well-established precedent, which endorsed litigation in the U.S. courts
under American law, even when initiated by foreigners who had
purchased foreign securities abroad."
To justify this exercise of federal jurisdiction, the vaunted Second
Circuit employed a modality entitled the "conduct" and "effects" test,
best exemplified in the modem iteration titled Alfadda v. Fenn. 2 Briefly
stated, Alfadda upheld the tandem notions that if the alleged securities
fraud entailed "conduct" within the United States or had some "effect"
upon the American capital markets, federal jurisdiction was obtained,
3
and a lawsuit under American securities law was viable.'

7. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
8. Id. at 250-51.
9. Id. at 251-52.
10. Id. at 253.
11. See Anthony Michael Sabino, "Big Eight" Beware: Multinational Accounting Firms and
the Increasing Scope of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the Federal Securities Laws, 63 ST.

JOHN's L. REv. 467, 474-75 (1989).
12. 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 12122(1995).
13. See Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 478; see also Sabino, supra note 11, at 493-97 (discussing, inter
alia, Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1987), wherein the D.C. Circuit
opted for a "more restrictive test" such as the Second Circuit's promulgation).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

448

Writing for the Supreme

[Vol. 46:445

Court in Morrison, Justice Scalia

wholeheartedly rejected the "conduct" and "effects" test so long
employed by the lower tribunals. Melding a variety of elements
emblematic of his core beliefs, Justice Scalia grounded the majority
opinion upon the following.
Justice Scalia first called attention to the longstanding precept that
there can be no extraterritorial application of U.S. law, absent a clear
declaration by Congress. 14 The learned Justice wisely refused to do
violence to the well-established edict that American law does not
normally extend beyond our own borders." Among other justifications
for this doctrine, Justice Scalia pointed out the potential for chaos and
enmity should we attempt to impose our legal standards upon the world
"

at large.

'

Justice Scalia noted that the foregoing axiom against the
extraterritorial application of American law can be set aside if Congress
makes clear in a statute's text that it is intended to have transnational
application." Yet "[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none."
From that cornerstone principle, Justice Scalia proceeded to debunk
the once prevalent "conduct" and "effects" test in a most straightforward
manner. First, he scrutinized the plain text of the operative statutes
around which the plaintiffs in Morrison had structured their case, most
especially the anti-fraud prohibition." The learned Justice concluded
that the plain text of section 10, the primary weapon in the war against
securities chicanery, never countenanced extraterritorial application. 2
Moreover, Justice Scalia chided the Second Circuit for having
strayed too far afield when it crafted the "conduct" and "effects" test
found in Alfadda and its antecedents. In his own inimitable words, he
took the New York-based tribunal to task, for reason that it "never put
forward a textual or even extra-textual basis for these tests."n

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255.
See id. at 255: see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269-70.
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id. at 261-62.
Id. at 265.
Id at 258.

22. Id. This debunking of the "conduct" and "effects" test by Justice Scalia was no small
matter, since that maxim was a creation of the Second Circuit, a tribunal long and well "regarded as
the 'Mother Court' in this area of the [securities] law." See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug

Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Upon a careful review of the legislative promulgations in this realm
from the time of the Great Depression to the modem day, Justice Scalia
concluded that the primary anti-fraud statute of the American securities
laws is bereft of any clear indication that Congress intended that proviso
to extend beyond U.S. borders.23 To cement the point, Justice Scalia
referenced other portions of the federal acts, and came to an identical
conclusion, to wit, a plain reading of the clear text of other sections of
the 1934 Exchange Act clearly lent no support to a finding of an
extraterritorial reach for our federal securities laws.24
It was at this juncture that Justice Scalia invoked the principles of
judicial reasoning for which he is legendary. Writing for the Morrison
Court, he warned against the evil of "judicial-speculation-made-law,"
that is to say, creating law out of whole cloth.25 The transgression of the
appellate tribunals upon this issue was that they continually indulged in
"divining what Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the
situation," in this context, the extraterritorial application of American
law to the transacting in foreign securities by foreigners as conducted on
exchanges beyond America's borders.26
To correct that error, Justice Scalia lauded the efficacy and
common sense of jurists abstaining from guessing as to what lawmakers
might have desired in unlegislated scenarios.27 The mistake of the lower
courts in this instance was particularly acute, found the Justice, given
that all that was required of the courts below was to forthrightly apply
the established presumption against the extraterritorial application of
American law.28
To be sure, Justice Scalia understood the context in which he was
disabusing the "conduct" and "effects" test for all time (unless the same
is revived by legislative enactment, of course). The clear-sighted jurist
parenthetically admitted that the federal securities laws are replete with
judge-made rules.29 Yet it was for this very reason that he urged
his brethren in the federal judiciary to scrupulously avoid imposing

23.

Morrison, 561 U.S. at 264-65.

24. Id. at 263-64. Better known as section 30 of the Exchange Act, its plain text provides that
the 1934 Act does not bring within its purview the actions of "any person insofar as he transacts a
business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States," unless he undertakes such
activity in a purposeful attempt to evade what would otherwise be the lawful application of
American securities law. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2012).

25.
26.
27.
28.

Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261.
Id.
Id
Id. at 255-56.

29.

Id. at 261 n.5 (quoting id at 276 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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their own preferences, and leave it to Congress to "legislate with
predictable effects." 30
We regard Morrison as one of Justice Scalia's more notable
opinions because it so well reflects the character of his jurisprudence.
The learned Justice utilized Morrison, not merely to bring an end to
judicially invented rubrics that were sadly lacking in a statutory
foundation, but also to provide a cautionary tale against judicial fiat.
Consonant with his overall approach to principled adjudication,
Justice Scalia took this opportunity to advocate for judicial restraint,
championing for his brethren to delimit themselves to applying statutes
as written by the people's elected representatives. 3' As was his wont,
Justice Scalia grounded such precautions upon the importance of the
separation of powers and checks and balances that are the hallmarks of
our tripartite system of government.32
The sensibility of Justice Scalia's words in Morrison have already
begun to resonate across all branches of federal law. Notwithstanding its
relative newness to the scene, the decision has already given birth to
some notable progeny. Justice Scalia's wisdom in the opinion provided
the cornerstone for the Court's decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Community.33
In that opinion authored by Justice Alito, the high bench carefully
parsed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970
("RICO"), 34 yet another complex body of federal law, and held that
certain provisions of that anti-racketeering act specifically contemplate
wrongful acts outside the United States as a predicate for jurisdiction.
On that basis, the Morrison presumption against extraterritoriality
was overcome.3 6
It was all for naught, however, in that particular instance. Since
RICO demands that the plaintiff allege a domestic injury, and these
claimants had waived all allegations of injuries sustained within
American territory, the Supreme Court ultimately held the case had to be
dismissed. 37 Nevertheless, RJR provides an important utilization of the
precepts set forth by Justice Scalia in Morrison.
And so, we end here our discussion of our first segment of Justice
Scalia's more noteworthy contributions to a specific realm of American
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 261.
Id. at 261 & n.5.
See id.
136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2012).
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101-02.
Id. at 2101.
Id. at 2111.
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law. Our next topic of choice pertains to a methodology of dispute
resolution that has become increasingly important to the administration
of justice in America. The late Justice played an important role in
assuring the continued vitality of that alternative to litigation, and we
now turn to examine that contribution to the relevant jurisprudence.
III.

ARBITRATION, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE,

CONSUMERS, AND A WORD ON CLASS ACTIONS:
AT&T MOBILITY V. CONCEPCION

Courtroom litigation has always been a difficult and timeconsuming endeavor, combined with risks that sometimes outweigh the
potential rewards. Modern times have exacerbated such factors,
particularly so with regard to the prodigious expense and delay attendant
with bringing a contemporary matter to trial.
That explains why current modes of alternative dispute resolution,
particularly arbitration, have come into great favor. Arbitration offers
various efficiencies and levels of participation in the process that
ordinary litigation does not."
Notwithstanding such positive attributes, opposition decidedly
hostile to arbitration has recently arisen. Seemingly rooted in the
opinions of the press, as inflamed by certain politicians, those critical of
alternative dispute resolution contend it has been rendered unfair and
unjust by powerful corporate interests who have rigged the process to
serve their own avaricious ends. 39 Enemies of arbitration now agitate to

38.

See, e.g., Rule 12403. Cases with Three Arbitrators, FrN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY,

http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/displaymain.html?rbid=2403&elementid=4141 (last visited
Feb. 15, 2018). In securities industry arbitration, all parties in a particular controversy are given lists
of neutral adjudicators to rank in order of their individual preferences. Id. The final panel of
arbitrators is drawn based upon the combined rankings. Id. Parties thereby actually participate in
selecting their arbitrators, a process far different from the random selection of the presiding jurist in
ordinary court cases. Id. (describing the procedure for parties to rank and strike arbitrators, these
rankings subsequently combined to bring forth an arbitration panel).
39. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a 'Privatizationof
the Justice System', N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2015, at Al. Asserting that "corporations . . have used
arbitration to create an alternate system of justice," the article purports to bring to light "many
troubling cases" of abuses of the arbitral process. Id at Al, B4. With all due respect to the
venerable New York Times, the piece is largely a collection of anecdotes, heavy on the melodrama
and loose with characterizations of arbitration as "legal free-for-alls" presided over by arbitrators
with open conflicts of interest that lead them to favor defendants, particularly corporate ones. We
respectfully suggest the critics of arbitration, especially the Gray Lady of the Fourth Estate,
examine, among other things, securities industry arbitrations conducted by the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"). There, one will find over seven thousand arbitrators who in 2016
closed 3635 arbitrations, with 3681 new cases filed that same year. See Dispute Resolution
Statistics,FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/dispute-

resolution-statistics (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). In the same period, FINRA arbitrators confronted
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restrict or ban outright arbitration clauses from various types of
contracts, specifically contracts for goods and services that consumers
often enter into with large providers.40
Yet before the nay-sayers become too self-righteous in their
virulent opposition to arbitration, we would advise them to closely
examine the Supreme Court's decision in AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion,41 a decision that resoundingly placed the high Court's
continuing imprimatur of approval upon arbitration as a valid and lawful
means of resolving disputes. 42 It was there that Justice Scalia made his
own weighty contribution to assuring that arbitration maintains its
rightful place as a worthy alternative to the tumult and risk of
litigation. 43 The Justice accomplished this, not only by virtue of the
cogent reasoning found therein, but also by his exemplification of a
factual template for an arbitral process that will surely influence the
shape of such proceedings for many years to come, particularly in
disputes involving ordinary consumers.4 4
In brief, the facts of the case tell us the Concepions claimed the
supposedly "free" cell phones they had purchased from the wireless
carrier were not truly "free," for reason that AT&T had charged them a
few dollars of state sales tax. 4 5 Thus aggrieved, but recognizing the
paltry dollars at stake, the couple aimed to commence a class
action against the telecom giant, no doubt in order to garner a more
worthwhile recovery.46
But maintaining a class action in the Concepcions' native
California state court should have been stymied by the fact that their
wireless service contract called for the referral of all controversies to
arbitration.4 7 In reliance upon that accord, AT&T sought to compel the
Concepcions to arbitrate the dispute, just as their agreement demanded.48

customer disputes encompassing, inter alia, allegations of misrepresentation in 1670 cases, and
fraud in 1301 proceedings. Id. It is contended this is but one of several samplings more
representative of the efficacy of modem arbitration, when properly conducted, of course.
40. See Suzanne Barlyn, Warren Slams Wells Fargo Over Arbitration Position, REUTERS
(Nov. 29. 2016), www.reuters.com/article/us-wells-fargo-acounts-arbitration-idUSKBNI3N2GA
(characterizing the bank's dispute resolution process as "closed-door, industry-friendly arbitration,"
and calling for federal regulation eliminating mandatory arbitration clauses from consumer
contracts).

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

563 U.S. 333 (2011).
Id at 344-45.
Id. at 350-52.
See id. at 344-52.
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id. at 336-37.
Id. at 337.
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Detennined to overcome the arbitration clause, these putative class
representatives sought to exploit a judge-made rule of the California
state courts that disfavored arbitration if that alternative process posed an
obstacle to a class action lawsuit. 49 The essential question thus presented
in Concepcion was this: Could a contradictory rule of state law
overwhelm a strong federal policy endorsing arbitration as an alternative
means of resolving disputes?"o
Writing for the high Court, Justice Scalia replied with a most
definitive "no."' He then proceeded to author an opinion exemplifying
the Supreme Court's vigorous and uninterrupted support for the strong
federal policy favoring arbitration, as mandated by the robust statutory
authority ousting any state law doctrine to the contrary.52 Furthermore,
Justice Scalia in Concepcion articulated a number of enduring points that
should assure a bright and continuing future for arbitration across a
broad spectrum of domains.
As the first step in his cogent analysis, Justice Scalia once more
advocated for the interpretation of statutes in accordance with their plain
meaning.- He precisely applied that axiom to the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA"), a body of law enacted by Congress in 1925."
Justice Scalia found the nearly century old law unequivocally
upheld agreements to arbitrate as legal, valid, and enforceable.
Thereafter, the Court readily concluded that the arbitration clause in
question, when viewed through the prism of this title of the United
States Code, was indisputably binding.5 1
Yet another stone had to be set into the foundation of Concepcion,
and for that Justice Scalia implicitly relied upon the constitutional edict
found in the Supremacy Clause." Elementarily, the Supremacy Clause
declares that federal law overwhelms and nullifies any contrary state rule
of law, whether the latter is statutory or judge-made.59

49.

Id. at 337-38; see also Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005)

(asserting that contractual provisions compelling arbitration were unconscionable if they forbade the
plaintiff from asserting a class action), abrogatedbv Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339-40.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 344-52.
Id. at 339, 344.
Id. at 344.
Id at 339-40 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)).
Id. at 344.
Id. at 351-52.
See id. at 341.

59. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. In a layperson's terms, the Supremacy Clause puts the "United"
in "United States," by assuring that a local law which conflicts with the unitary national law is
rendered unenforceable, for reason of its contradictory nature. See Anthony Michael Sabino,
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Suprenes Affirm Supremacy Clause but Point Out Alternatives for States, NAT.
ELECTRICITY, July 2016, at 1, 3.
60. Sabino, supranote 59, at 3.

61.

GAS

&

The principles of federal supremacy are as old as the Republic
itself, and these maxims, in turn, give rise to the implementing
doctrine of "preemption." 60 As implicated by Concepcion, this broad
notion is then subdivided along the lines of "field preemption" and
"conflict preemption.'6
As to the first, where Congress intends to occupy a certain
legislative domain, any contradictory state law is ousted from the field
already occupied by federal enactments. 62 in a similar vein, the precept
of conflict preemption is that a state postulation in evident conflict with
a national proviso must yield to the latter, in order to forestall
disharmony from state to state. 63
Justice Scalia brought this constitutional notion to bear, writing in
Concepcion that preemption of the contrary California rule was the only
possible result.64 He found Congress clearly intended to occupy the field
by promulgating an act that explicitly favored arbitration as a means of
alternative dispute resolution.6 ' The strictures of supremacy mandated
that the FAA prevail in Concepcion.6 6
In sweeping aside the state rule that purported to prevent the
enforceability of the arbitration clause in the case at bar, the Justice
expounded upon the history of the FAA. 6 ' He noted that one of
the legislation's paramount goals was to, once and for all, set
aside the parochial interests of the states, and even state court jurists,
who stood arrayed in opposition to arbitration as an alternative to
full-blown litigation. 8
For our aside to those aforementioned current foes of arbitration,
we ask them to take due note that Justice Scalia in Concepcion did not
blindly award victory to so-called "corporate interests." Rather, the
learned Justice engaged in principled decision making, based foremost
upon longstanding Supremacy Clause jurisprudence, as exemplified in
well-established axioms of constitutional preemption. 69

See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344-46 (applying conflict preemption): id. at 352 (applying

field preemption).
62. Sabino, supranote 59, at 3.
63. See, e.g., Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344-46.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 352.
See id. at 343, 345.
See id. at 351-52.
See id at 339-41.
Id. at 344.

69.

See supra note 61 and accompanying text.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol46/iss2/4

10

Sabino: Reflections upon the Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia: Sel

2017]

THE JURISPRUDENCE OFJUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA

455

Returning to a point made at the outset of this discussion, we
opined that Concepcion provides a valuable template as to how to
properly structure an arbitration procedure in order to assure fairness,
especially in the context of a consumer-related controversy. Our point of
view is solidly grounded upon Justice Scalia's detailed elaboration of
how the arbitration process engineered by AT&T in that case actually
worked in favor of the Concepcions and similarly situated consumers.
In parsing the terms and conditions for arbitration found in the
wireless service contract these consumers had signed, Justice Scalia
pointed out that the corporation was required to pay all the costs of
arbitration (unless the customer's claim was subsequently found to be
frivolous).7 0 The venue of the arbitration was to be closest to the
consumer's home, not the company's.n If the customer's claim was for
$10,000 or less, the customer was allowed to choose to be heard in
person, via telephone conference with the arbitrator, or on papers
alone.72 Undeniably, the provisions of the arbitration clause already
provided a number of advantages to the consumer in taking on this
corporate titan.
Yet Justice Scalia found even more aspects of this agreed-toprocess worthy of noting. An "escape hatch" provided the customer with
the option to forego arbitration entirely, and proceed directly to a small
claims court.73 An aggrieved consumer could request punitive damages
against AT&T.74 In contradistinction, the company was forbidden to
seek attorneys' fees for defending itself in this consumer arbitration."
Finally, in the event the arbitrator awarded the customer an amount that
exceeded AT&T's last written settlement offer, the telecom giant was
required to pay the consumer a minimum of $7500 and twice the
claimant's attorneys' fees.76
We find Justice Scalia's exemplification of the procedural aspects
of the underlying arbitration in Concepcion to be quite prescient.
Predating by several years the current outcry by some against contractual
consumer arbitration, the Justice illuminated the key characteristics of an
arbitral structure that assures fairness, and, one might even say,
solicitude to the ordinary claimant. We might very well look back upon
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337, 351-52.
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id; see also Anthony Michael Sabino & Michael A. Sabino, Law of the Land: US.

Supreme Court Upholds Arbitration Agreements Despite State Court Resistance, NASSAU L., Dec.
2011, at 3 (discussing the tenns of the AT&T arbitration agreement).
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Justice Scalia's contribution in Concepcion as pioneering the road
towards more fair and just consumer arbitration proceedings.
For a final note, Concepion also imparts certain wisdom of Justice
Scalia upon the related matter of class actions. In a pithy commentary
upon class actions generally, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
specifically, 7 Justice Scalia emphasized that class action lawsuits are a
form of representative litigation." As such, they present entirely unique
issues of notice, due process, and proper defense.79
Pertinent to the resolution of Concepcion, Justice Scalia strongly
reminded that litigation by a class is intrinsically antithetical to
arbitration." The latter is a virtuous process for reason of its efficiencies,
and the more expeditious track that arbitration routinely takes. It
achieves these things by delimiting itself to resolving disputes between
parties on an individual basis, and not via putative representatives
speaking for outsized groups.8 1
Properly aligning these distinctions as part and parcel to deciding
Concepcion, Justice Scalia was quite explicit in concluding that lawful
agreements to arbitrate must be upheld, precisely as the statutes require,
even when the erstwhile putative class representatives prefer to bypass
the arbitral forum in favor of leading a class of claimants.
I am confident that Justice Scalia's insights into class actions
brought pursuant to Rule 23 shall play a role in shaping class litigation
in the federal courts for many years to come. More important, however,
is his endorsement of the continued preeminence of the FAA, whenever
and wherever arbitration is validly agreed to. His writing in Concepcion
assures that arbitration remains a viable and worthwhile alternative to
customary courtroom proceedings.
To be sure, an early indication of the truth of the foregoing was
most recently provided by the Court in Kindred Nursing Centers Limited
Partnership v. Clark," where once more the high bench invalidated a
state-created rule disfavoring arbitration, and directed the parties to
return to the arbitral forum.8 4 For its ratio decendi in Kindred, the
present day Court built its reasoning around the cornerstone of

77.

See FED. R. Clv. P. 23 (governing class actions in the federal courts).

78.
79.

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348-49.
Id. at 348-50; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338. 348, 362-63 (2011)

(discussing, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, the procedural protections of class action suits).

80. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346-48.
81. Id. at 347-48, 352.
82. Id. at 351-52.
83. 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017).
84. Id. at 1426-27.
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Concepcion, amply demonstrating that Justice Scalia's reasoning therein
still lights the path towards enforcing agreements to arbitrateY 5
Thus far, we have exemplified Justice Scalia's paramount
contributions to the fields of federal securities law and arbitration,
respectively. A characteristic of such jurisprudence is that it impacts,
most keenly, parties involved in discrete and private disputes.
IV.

CHEVRON DEFERENCE AND CABINING
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

What of controversies arising between the people, acting in matters
of commerce, and representatives of their elected government seeking to
regulate those same enterprises? This can be said to fall under the
general heading of administrative law. We are pleased to report that,
once more, Justice Scalia's writings have had an impact in that domain,
and so we turn to this for our next topic.
A.

Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency

While the orthodoxy regarding constitutional law espouses that
there are only three separate and equal branches of government, much
has been said about the ascendancy of a Fourth Branch of the federal
construct, that being the administrative branch. It is beyond peradventure
that, since before the midpoint of the last century, administrative
agencies play an influential role in regulating businesses, and even
everyday American life.
The touchstone for defining the scope of regulatory power has long
been the eponymous "Chevron deference" standard, as set forth in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc." In
that decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, a legend in her
own right, the Court announced that the judiciary must defer, at least in
the first analysis, to the agencies when the latter are engaged in
promulgating rules within the sphere of their administrative bailiwick."
Notwithstanding the banner raised by Chevron, Justice Scalia from
time to time questioned the continued viability, and even the desirability,
of that holding's central tenet. During what subsequently turned out to
be some of his final years on the high bench, Justice Scalia participated

85.

Id at 1426-28.

86. 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (holding wherever Congress has left a gap in a statutory
scheme, an agency's interstitial regulations "are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute").

87.

Id at 842-45.
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in at least two noteworthy opinions addressing the boundaries of
administrative agency power.
One of these was the admittedly tortuous read, Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency,88 wherein the
Justices undertook the unenviable task of dissecting incredibly dense and
confounding environmental regulations propounded by the abovenamed
agency in its efforts to administer the Clean Air Act."
The highly technical substance of Utility Air defies easy synthesis,
but, fortunately, such a burdensome exercise is not our purpose here.
I am content, rather, to call to the reader's attention to the far more
significant and long-lasting commentary of Justice Scalia pertaining to
the ever-present need to check the unbridled power of administrative
agencies, and the unelected and faceless bureaucrats that reside therein.
Among other things in the opinion he authored for the majority,
Justice Scalia remonstrates that agencies "must operate 'within the
bounds of reasonable interpretation"' of the regulatory schemes created
by elected lawmakers.o In order to stay within that zone of rational
interpretation, administrative matrices devised by Congress must be
contemplated by the regulators as a whole, not as disjointed pieces.91
And should an administrative agency stray outside those boundaries,
nominal Chevron deference dissipates, and the courts are permitted to
make a penetrating inquiry into the legality of the rules propounded by
the agency.
Justice Scalia made it abundantly clear in Utility Air that the
deference Chevron imposes upon the judicial review of agency action is
not without limitation. Such acquiescence first requires that regulators
have acted within the confines of the clear statutory text provided by
Congress.93 The worthy Justice qualified the deferential standard as
applicable where the agency has confined its actions to resolving
"interstices created by statutory silence or ambiguity." 94

88.
89.

134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
Id. at 2434 (citing Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 159, 69 Stat. 322 (codified as amended at 42
§§ 7 4 01-7671q (2012))). Given the vociferous debate of the present era over the

U.S.C.
phenomenon called "climate change," it is worth noting that the EPA standards at issue in Utility
Air pertained to "greenhouse gases" emitted by motor vehicles, and believed by many to be a major
contributor to that species of manmade pollution. See Chevron, 134 S. Ct. at 2434.

90. Chevron, 134 S. Ct. at 2442 (quoting City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 295
(2013)).
91. Id. (describing perceived ambiguity in an isolated proviso often disappears when that
same section is viewed as part of a larger whole).

92. Id.
93. Id. at 2439.
94. Id. at 2445.
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The veteran jurist readily admitted that regulators possess "both
authority and responsibility to resolve some questions left open
by Congress," which arise in the ordinary course of carrying out a
given administrative scheme. 95 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia found it
manifest that such allowance "does not include a power to revise clear
statutory tenrins." 96
Lucid as always, the Justice declared that administrative agencies
simply "cannot change the law" when it suits them.9 7
In justifying the need for such a clear-cut imperative, Justice Scalia
takes the time in Utility Air to explain why it is so vital to cabin the
power of administrative agencies." Nothing less than the fundamental
constitutional safeguard of separation of powers is at stake, he opined. 9
In emoting the fundamental truth that "Congress makes laws and
the President, acting at times through agencies . . . faithfully execute[s]
them," Justice Scalia illustrates how that guarantee of our ordered
system of liberty is at serious risk when agencies, ostensibly limited to
administering the law, deign to pronounce it themselves, without the
sanction of elected legislators. 0 o To condone agencies indulging
themselves in the latter is to "deal a severe blow to the Constitution's
separation of powers."' 0
Justice Scalia once more demonstrated his matchless ability to turn
a pithy phrase, announcing in Utility Air that the Supreme Court is "not
willing to stand on the dock and wave goodbye" whenever
administrative agencies chart their own course.' 0 2 Quite to the contrary,

"the core administrative law principle [is] that an agency may not
rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how [a] statute

should operate."03
With such customary eloquence, Justice Scalia achieves a faithful
duality regarding the principles of regulatory power. While remaining
true

to

the

established

jurisprudence

of

Chevron deference,

he

nevertheless spoke convincingly that such an axiom must never be
misconstrued as a license to government regulators to do as they please,

without accountability to the American electorate.1
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

04

Id. at 2446.
Id. (citing Bamhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002)).
Id.
Id.
Id.

100.

Id. (intemal quotations omitted) (citing U.S. CONST. art. III,

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer
City Generation, L.P.

For our last exemplification on this precise topic, we briefly take
cognizance of Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City
Generation, L.P. o5 best classified as a first cousin to Justice Scalia's
opinion for the majority in Utility Air.'0 6 Yet, in sharp contrast, on this
occasion we witness Justice Scalia writing in dissent, as joined by his
colleague Justice Thomas."
Justice Scalia opens his riposte with a stirring pronouncement.
"Too many important decisions of the Federal Government are made
nowadays by unelected agency officials exercising broad lawmaking
authority, rather than by the people's representatives in Congress."'o
In the instant case, Justice Scalia repeated the axiom that
administrative agencies are limited to imposing rules that fall within the
proscriptions first established by Congress in the animating statutory
scheme.'0 Finding the air pollution restrictions propounded by the
agency in EME to exceed those legislative boundaries, the learned
dissenter declared they "deserve[d] no deference under Chevron."'"
In this fashion, the worthy Justice decried the presence in EME of
the very dangers he forecast in Utility Air; government regulators
exercising the lawmaking function constitutionally reserved to the
Article I branch, in derogation of separation of powers."'
Given the conjunction between Utility Air and EME, we witness in
the former opinion Justice Scalia's willingness to uphold Chevron
deference, provided the agency action in controversy falls within the
confines of the statutory scheme enacted by the lawmakers. Yet in
contradistinction, the learned Justice sharply pivoted to a contrary view
in the latter decision, based upon his conclusion that there the agency's
wanderings outside its legislated domain usurped the lawmaking
prerogatives exclusively reserved to the legislature.
It is respectfully asserted that the principled decision making of
Justice Scalia in these companion decisions shall continue to resonate in

105.

134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).

106. In sum, the EME Court addressed the efforts of Congress and the EPA "to cope with a
complex problem: air pollution emitted in one State, but causing harm in other States. Left
unregulated, the emitting or upwind State reaps the benefits of the economic activity" while
"downwind states . . are unable to achieve clean air." Id. at 1593.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1610 (Scalia,

J.,

dissenting).

1610-11.
1611.
1610.
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administrative law jurisprudence for many years to come. 112 Far more
important, his postulations in that domain shall no doubt play a role in
the even more important matter of maintaining one of the more virtuous
paradigms of our constitutional system.
That constitutional imperative is the separation of powers. The
peculiar nature of the so-called administrative branch-ostensibly a
mere subsidiary of the executive branch, yet oft times realistically an
independent organ of government-frequently gives rise to
controversies implicating that very mandate. One such conflagration is
with us now, and it is forecast that Justice Scalia's relevant jurisprudence
will play a key role in squelching its fires. For that reason, we turn to it
as our final subject.
V.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES AND AGENCY HEADS: A NEW
STRUGGLE OVER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE AND

SEPARATION OF POWERS

While the immediately foregoing material reflects Justice Scalia's
views upon the institutional power of administrative agencies, the
Justice's writings are similarly instructive in considering equally
important questions regarding the constitutional exercise of power by
individuals within such regulatory bodies. To begin, one must first
recognize the path by which these administrators take and continue to
hold positions of responsibility within the Article II branch.
Such matters are regulated by the firm demands of the
Appointments Clause, which installs in the President the power to
appoint principal "Officers of the United States" necessary to assist the
President in executing the laws of the land."' Significantly, this power
to appoint is conjoined to the Chief Executive's right to dismiss these
same officials at will. 1 14

It can truthfully be said that the second prerogative is the more
significant of the two. The removal power assures foremost that these
unelected officeholders remain accountable, not just to the President
who appointed them, but, more importantly, to the people who elected
that Chief Executive in the first instance.
Standing in contradistinction to the principal officers of the nation
are the so-called "inferior officers" of government. The Appointments
112. For further analysis of the scope of administrative agency power, see generally Anthony
Michael Sabino, As Oneok Drew Regulatory Line for Gas, So Does EPSA for Electricity, NAT. GAS
& ELECTRICITY, May 2016, at 10; and Michael A. Sabino, Supreme Court Clarifies Federal Versus
State Authority over Natural Gas. NAT. GAS & ELECTRICITY, Jan. 2016, at 1.
113. U.S. CONST. art. II, 2, cl. 2.

114. See id.
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Clause provides that such persons may be appointed by the President
alone, the courts or the heads of the federal departments.'
The functional reality is that these officeholders are much more
akin to civil servants in how they attain and remain in their positions.
Germane to the following analysis, this distinguishing characteristic
quite logically places these inferior officers beyond the Chief
Executive's power to terminate their time in office." 6
Yet it is not unknown in our jurisprudence to encounter a situation
where an individual is responsible for the execution of the laws of the
United States, but, for whatever reason, is thought to stand beyond the
President's removal power. Such scenarios have provided the Supreme
Court with a plenitude of opportunities to first classify such persons as
principal or inferior officers, and second, if necessary, declare a
constitutional infirmity for reason of infidelity to Appointments Clause
strictures, primarily the vital inclusion of a presidential right
of removal.'

Presently, just such an Appointments Clause controversy is roiling
its way through the federal courts. Truth be told, the dispute is actually
comprised of two distinct, yet intertwined, branches. The first arises
from the arena of federal securities law, a domain where Justice Scalia
played an influential role, as previously discussed.
For most of its history, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") has employed administrative law judges ("ALJs")."' These
jurists preside and issue rulings in proceedings brought by the SEC
against those accused of malfeasance in the stock markets."' Notably,
ALJs are not appointed by the President, and enjoy a form of tenure that
20
places them beyond the President's power to remove them at will.1
In a highly contentious spate of cases, a number of respondents in
SEC enforcement actions have resisted the power of the ALJs to hear
and decide their cases.' 2 ' The defendants contend that, since these quasijurists hold office without being subject to the removal power of the

115.
116.
117.

Id
Id.
See Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477. 483-86

(2010) (finding an Appointments Clause violation where members of an accounting industry
oversight board exercised executive power, yet were immune from removal by the President).

118.

See Michael A. Sabino & Anthony Michael Sabino, Challenging the Power ofSEC ALJs:

A ConstitutionalCrisis or a More Nuanced,4pproach?43 SEC. REG. L.J. 369, 369, 376 (2015).

119.
120.
121.

Id. at 373, 378.
Id. at 376, 378.
Id. at 373, 376-77, 379.
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President, the Appointments Clause is violated whenever the ALJs
exercise their adjudicatory powers.1 2 2
The first iteration of this tempestuous litigation comprised a
divergent body of district court opinions. Nearly every one of these early
decisions reflected the idiosyncratic approach of the presiding trial
judge, as each jurist sought a resolution true to the canons of the
Appointments Clause.' 2 3
Now that this plethora of lower court rulings has percolated to the
appellate level, we now have before us a veritable legion of circuit court
cases seeking answers to the fundamental question of whether or not the
SEC ALJs constitutionally hold office.' 24 Admittedly, the tribunals
appear to be coalescing, more or less, around a rough consensus
supportive of maintaining the SEC's adjudicators in power. 2 5 Yet it is
undeniable that there exists an internecine conflict that only the Supreme
Court can end.
To be sure, it is respectfully contended that the intervention of the
high Court in this matter is a necessity. More is at stake here that the
singular issue of the power of this particular batch of ALJs to hear
proceedings brought by Wall Street's primary watchdog.
In this century, entire battalions of ALJs work at countless federal
agencies. They decide controversies that impact Americans great and not
so great each and every day. The reach of the anticipated postulations of
the high Court in this context shall not end with the securities law arena.
Rather, the Supreme Court's findings with regard to the Appointments
Clause here shall resonate across an entire galaxy of administrative
agencies and their own in-house adjudicators.
Having illuminated the first branch of this controversy, we now
proceed to the second. The latter segment of the ongoing dispute calls
into question the constitutionality of the continuance in office of the
head of an influential federal agency. Ironically, the body in question is
one recently given authority over certain subdivisions of the worlds of
banking and finance, and, one might venture, conducts its regulatory

122.

Id. at 376-77, 379.

123.
124.

See id. (analyzing the then-extant cases).
As of this writing, a representative sampling of those circuit decisions includes, but is not

limited to: Bandimere v. S.E.C., 844 F.3d 1168, 1171 (10th Cir. 2016); RaymondJ. Lucia Cos. v.
S.E.C., 832 F.3d 277, 280 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated, reh'g granted, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017),
cert. granted sub nom. Lucia v. S.E.C., No. 17-130, 2018 WL 386565 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2018); Hill v.
S.E.C., 825 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 2016): Tilton v. S.E.C., 824 F.3d 276, 279-81 (2d Cir. 2016),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct 29 (2016); Beho v. S.E.C., 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015); and Jarkesv v.
S.E.C., 803 F.3d 9, 15, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
125. See, e.g., Ravnond1J Lucia, 832 F.3d at 283-89 (reasoning that SEC ALJs do not violate
the Constitution).
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business in a state of tension with the above discussed SEC regarding
which one of them is the primary regulator in these domains.
The agency in play is the newcomer Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau ("CFPB"), and, dissimilar to nearly every other federal
administrative body of consequence, it has but a single Director at its
apex.'12 More to the point, that bureau chief enjoys a form of tenure
placing him outside the President's power to remove at will.'1 2

And

therein lies the root of the controversy.
That case is PHH Corporation v. Consumer FinancialProtection

Bureau,2 8 where the titular plaintiff, a mortgage lender, was the subject
of an agency proceeding.1 29 Finding the company in violation of various
pertinent regulations, the CFPB's Director ordered it to pay a $109
million charge.' 3 0 Refusing to knuckle under, the mortgage lender
challenged the decision on the grounds that the Director held office in
violation of the Appointments Clause, and that constitutional defect
nullified his regulatory edicts.'
Upon hearing the case for the first time, the D.C. Circuit concurred
that the Appointments Clause had indeed been violated when Congress
structured the bureau in such a manner as to give its leader immunity
from presidential removal.'1 2 In a strongly worded opinion authored by
Circuit Judge Kavanaugh, the panel made an in-depth exploration of
separation of powers, and related it to the prerequisites of the
Appointments Clause.

33

Yet the matter is far from over. On January 3 1, 2018, the
D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed-a fractured bench found the
CFPB Director's insulation from presidential oversight consistent with
the Appointments Clause.1 34
Similar to the foregoing prognostications with regard to the SEC

ALJ offshoot of the fundamental controversy, this author is confident
that the high Court will ultimately review the matter. Moreover, the need
for such oversight is even more pronounced.

126. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016). rev d en hanc,
No. 15-1177, 2018 WL 627055 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 2018).
127. Id at 15.
128. Id. at 6.
129. Id. at 7.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 12.
132. Id. at 31, 36.
133. Id. at 6-9.
134. See general/v PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 15-1177, 2018 WL 627055
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 2018) (en bane).
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In PHH, we see in sharp definition, not only the matter of the
proper interpretation of the Appointments Clause, but the far more
essential issue of separation of powers. Only the Supreme Court can
speak authoritatively to questions of such magnitude.
Now, this Article rightly concerns itself first and foremost with the
selected jurisprudence of Justice Scalia. Staying true to that purpose, the
following demonstration is given.
First, the SEC ALJ question implicates the enforcement of federal
securities law, a domain where this Article has already exposited Justice
Scalia's outsized contribution to the field in the form of Morrison. The
second aspect of the pending Appointments Clause dilemma holds
at its center a federal agency principally tasked with regulating
consumer protection, a matter very much implicated by Justice Scalia
in Concepcion.13 5
In addition, the opinions of the learned Justice in the
companionable decisions of Utility Air and EME might well play a role
in determining the proper scope of the CFPB's power as an
administrative body. Yet this pales in comparison to what is foreseeable
as to be the invocation of Justice Scalia's wisdom on the essential
constitutional point at issue in both these boiling controversies.
It is respectfully posited here that the paramount constitutional
question of separation of powers, as exemplified in this two-headed
controversy, shall ultimately be determined with a powerful reliance
upon an opinion rendered by Justice Scalia in his early days sitting on
the high Court. That case is one of the learned Justice's most memorable
and enduring contributions to constitutional jurisprudence.
This is the edifice of constitutional law called Morrison v. Olson.13 6
There, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a seven-to-one majority, held
that the appointment of Morrison as an independent counsel was
constitutional, for reason that her post was one of an "inferior officer."'
Therefore, the fact that this individual could not be removed at the will
of the Chief Executive did not constitute a violation of Appointments
Clause requirements.'
In his solitary dissent, Justice Scalia, at the time still quite new to
the austere corridors of the Supreme Court, authored words that to this
day strongly resonate when the Constitution is believed to be in crisis.

135. See supranotes 40-44 and accompanying text.
136. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). This Morrison bears no relation to the aforementioned Morrison v.
National Australia Bank. See supro Part 11. To avoid confusion, we shall refer to the former by its
full caption.

137.
138.

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659-60, 671-72, 695.
Id. at 670-71.
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'

His first robust characterization was that our system of ordered liberty is
not one of men, but of laws."' And one of those most sacred laws is the
founding axiom of separation of powers. 140
Justice Scalia then turned to place the foundational doctrine of
separation of powers in counterpoise to the matters disputed in Morrison
v. Olson, and found an essential correlation. He declared, "That is what
this suit is about. Power. The allocation of power among Congress, the
President, and the courts in such fashion as to preserve the equilibrium
the Constitution sought to establish" in order to resist a concentration of
authority in the one or the few. 14
The learned Justice swiftly rejected any banal assertion that
separation of powers was merely some convenience assuring a smoothly
functioning bureaucracy.1 42 Quite to the contrary, Justice Scalia
resolutely declared that "[t]he purpose of the separation of powers in
general, and of the unitary Executive in particular, was not merely to
assure effective government but to preserve individualfreedom." 4 3
Even in those relatively early days of his tenure on the Court,
Justice Scalia commenced to build the foundation for his strong belief in
textualism and originalism, and to justify his adherence to those maxims.
Demonstrating his enduring faith in the Founders and the monument to
freedom we know as the Constitution, Justice Scalia proclaimed a belief
he would often reiterate in his many opinions. "I prefer to rely upon the
judgment of the wise men who constructed our system, and of the
people who approved it, and of two centuries of history that have shown
it to be sound."

44

This brings us to our denouement, which indefatigably links the
current Appointments Clause tempest to the words of warning first
announced by the learned Justice nearly three decades prior. Refusing to
treat the case then at bar as some pedestrian inter-branch rivalry, Justice
Scalia recognized it as a challenge to core constitutional principles.
His stinging declaration: Morrison v. Olson did not present a wolf
in sheep's clothing. Rather, "this wolf comes as a wolf."' 45 Today, we
need look no further than PHH's direct quotation of that pronouncement,
as part and parcel of that panel's holding,1 46 to be convinced that Justice
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id
Id. at 699.
Id
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 734 (emphasis added).
Id. at 699.
PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting)), reh g en banc granted, order vacated, No. 15-
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Scalia's wisdom, as found in Morrison v. Olson's iconic dissent and
elsewhere within his writings, shall play a pivotal role in the Supreme
Court arriving at decisions in these matters that uphold the separation of
powers so vital to the continuance of our ordered system of liberty. 14 7
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article commenced with the notation that the discussion
would be limited to a small, well defined subset of Justice Scalia's
opinions. While endeavoring to restrict this writing to those highly
selective domains, it is nonetheless self-evident that the learned Justice's
wisdom is not so easily confined.
In our view, this only serves to prove the magnitude of the late
Justice's contribution to American jurisprudence. Even when one is
sharply focused upon Justice Scalia's opinions addressing securities law,
arbitration, and administrative law, the reader will still witness how the
learned Justice's reasoning reflects a profound understanding of the
founding document in all its aspects.
Let us revel in the fact that Justice Scalia, even when ostensibly
instructing upon matters of commerce and finance, concurrently expands
our knowledge of the Constitution, and deepens our appreciation for the
freedom it guarantees. For these reasons, it can be anticipated that the
totality of the learned Justice's writings shall continue to influence our
jurisprudence for many generations to come.

1177, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2733 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017). To be quite certain, Circuit Judge
Kavanaugh not only cites or quotes Scalia's dissent in Morrison v. Olson several times, he
accurately mirrors its animating point, to wit: "This is a case about executive power and individual
liberty." Id at 5.
147. Indeed, we fully anticipate Justice Scalia's teachings shall continue to define the scope of
the CFPB's authority in other, equally significant ways. Most recently, the agency, still led by a
solitary Director, promulgated a new rule aimed at "prohibiting financial firms from forcing
[consumers] into arbitration in disputes over their bank and credit card accounts." Jessica SilverGreenberg & Michael Corkery, U.S. Agency Moves to Allow Consumers to Pursue Suits Against
Banks, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2017, at Al; see also C. Ryan Barber, CFPB, Testing
Trump and Republicans, Moves to Restrict Forced Arbitration, NAT'L L.J. (July 10, 2017),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjoumal/almID/1202792598949/?slretum=20180004222702
(discussing the finalized CFPB rule). Witness the unmistakable irony here. The CFPB promulgates
a rule that evidently defies Justice Scalia's postulations in Concepcion regarding arbitration mere
months after the learned Justice's teachings in Morrison v. Olson provide a significant part of the
basis for declaring that the head of that agency holds office in violation of the doctrine of separation
of powers. How can one avoid Justice Scalia's voice being resoundingly heard in both of these
instances?

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

23

*

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol46/iss2/4

*

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 4

24

